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The extent to which marriage market conditions explain diﬀerences in mar-
riage and employment decisions across blacks and whites and across men and
women is considered in a dynamic, two-sided model of marriage. The quantity
and quality of men and women in the marriage market evolve endogenously
over time in the model, and in turn inﬂuence the allocation of income within
married households and the ease with which single agents attract prospective
mates. The parameters of the model are estimated using a panel of young men
and women from the U.S. The results highlight the responsiveness of intra-
household transfers to changes in marriage market opportunities and the im-
portance of women’s options outside marriage in determining the black-white
gap in marriage rates. Policy experiments suggest that improving the socio-
economic characteristics of blacks and reducing the black-white gap in earnings
further decreases the black marriage rate, highlighting the importance of equi-
librium eﬀects.
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Several well-documented empirical regularities illustrate the dramatic diﬀerences in
family structure and employment behavior over time and across race and gender in
the U.S. Blacks are less likely to marry than whites (Brien, 1997; Saluter, 1994). In
addition, blacks who do form matches tend to delay marriage (DaVanzo and Rahman,
1993) and are more likely to divorce than whites (Martin and Bumpass, 1989). Several
interesting trends regarding racial diﬀerences in employment also emerge from the
data. Black males have lower employment rates than white males: data from the
1996 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort (NLSY79)
indicate that the average employment rate for black men in their mid thirties is 80%
as compared to 94% for white men. In contrast to men, the employment rate for
black married women is relatively high, 77% as compared to 68% for white married
women in the same sample.1
What forces underlie the racial diﬀerences in behavior? The most prominent
explanations point to relatively poor marriage market conditions, on both quantity
and quality dimensions, for black women as compared to white women. The quantity
dimension of the marriage market is measured by the sex ratio, deﬁned as the ratio
of single men to single women, an indicator of the relative availability of men versus
women in the marriage market (Becker, 1973). The sex ratio is consistently lower for
blacks than for whites throughout recent history for many reasons, including racial
diﬀerences in the sex ratio at birth and diﬀerences in homicide, accident and infant
mortality rates (Guttentag and Secord, 1983; Espenshade, 1985).2 As a result, the
quantity of prospective spouses for black women is limited relative to white women,
reducing the likelihood black women marry.
The quality of the marriage market can be measured by the distributions of socio-
economic characteristics of men and women, including education and labor market
1Furthermore, married black women are also more likely to work than their single counterparts,
while the converse holds for white women.
2In addition, a disproportionate number of black men enter the armed forces (Guttentag and
Secord, 1983).
2earnings. Wilson and Neckerman (1986) argue that diﬀerences in the quality of the
pools of potential black and white husbands explain the relatively low marriage rates
for black women: faced with poor prospects in the marriage market, black women
are more inclined to remain single than to marry a spouse with poor socio-economic
characteristics.3
This paper provides a uniﬁed framework within which to consider the links be-
tween aggregate conditions in the marriage market and individual employment, mar-
riage and divorce decisions. The marriage market evolves endogenously over time
within the model as individuals marry and divorce, driven in part by exogenous dif-
ferences in the aggregate stocks of men and women and blacks and whites in the
population. Diﬀerences in the aggregate stocks and in the spousal quality distri-
butions across race and sex create imbalances in marriage market conditions. Such
imbalances inﬂuence marriage and employment decisions through two channels.
First, in the spirit of Becker (1973) and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002),
supply and demand conditions play central roles in the intra-household allocation
process: the sex ratio measures marital opportunities of both partners outside the
current match and as such aﬀects the share of marital income each agent can com-
mand within the current marriage. As a result, agents whose marital opportunities
improve can attract higher quality spouses, receive larger income transfers within the
household and are therefore less likely to work. This feature of the model is consis-
tent with the high employment rates of white men as compared to black men and the
opposing trend for women, for the stocks of black men observed in the data are lower
than for black women while the converse holds for whites.4
Second, it is assumed marriage opportunities may not be available in every period
and the sex ratio aﬀects the amount of friction in the marriage market. In particular,
3This hypothesis has been tested extensively in the literature, for example Wood (1995) and
Brien (1997). The smaller gender gap in earnings for blacks relative to whites and the availability
of support programs for single women with children have also been cited as contributing factors to
the diﬀerences in marriage rates across race (Espenshade, 1985).
4Grossbard-Schectman (1993) also constructs a model whereby favorable conditions in the mar-
riage market improve the bargaining position of women and thus reduce female labor supply.
3the rate at which women and men meet in the marriage market is a function of the
relative size of the pools of single men and women as in Pissarides (1985). As a
result, individuals who experience a decrease in their aggregate stock meet potential
spouses with relative ease, for the number of potential competitors as compared to
the number of prospective spouses declines. Individuals can therefore be more choosy
regarding whether to marry and whether to divorce when faced with better prospects
in marriage. Marriage market conditions therefore have two opposing eﬀects on the
decision to marry. On one hand, increases in intra-household transfers and higher
contact rates increase the attractiveness of marriage and the opportunities to marry,
respectively. On the other, individuals in limited supply face a better marriage market
tomorrow and therefore have incentives to delay marriage or initiate divorce in the
current period.
The structural parameters of the full dynamic model are estimated using a sam-
ple of men and women from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort
(NLSY79). The period of time covered in this paper (1979-1994) is characterized by
substantial variation in the sex ratio, employment and marriage rates across race,
region and time. Several results are worth highlighting. First, the sex ratio has the
expected eﬀect on intra-household transfers: more favorable opportunities in the mar-
riage market translate into greater transfers within marriage. This ﬁnding conﬁrms
the important connection between the labor market and the marriage market, as in-
creases in the sex ratio have important income eﬀects on the employment decisions of
married couples. In particular, those facing poor marriage market opportunities are
allocated less resources within the household, a result consistent with the relatively
high employment rates of black women relative to white women and the relatively
low employment rates of black men relative to white men.
Second, the estimates indicate that the average married male pays a transfer to
his wife that exceeds the non-labor income in the household. One implication of
this ﬁnding is that marriage may be less desirable for those with low labor market
earnings, as the transfer necessary to form a match is non-trivial. The options of
black women outside marriage, combined with the poor labor market opportunities
4of black males, thus provide an explanation for the low marriage rates in the black
population. Finally, the results indicate the presence of substantial search friction
in the marriage market, where individuals with poor marriage market opportunities
face relatively high search friction. Thus, as a result of the low sex ratio in the
black marriage market, black women ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to contact a potential
spouse than white women. Together, these results provide insight into the causes
and consequences of diﬀerences in employment and marriage behavior across various
groups in the population.
The use of a two-sided model of marriage and employment that treats the sex
ratio as endogenous is particularly important if one is to consider the implications
of policies that change the desirability of marriage.5 Any policy change that alters
marriage rates today will have implications for the composition of the marriage market
and employment behavior in future periods. Treating the sex ratio as exogenous and
ignoring the decisions made by both men and women in the marriage market prohibits
the study of such eﬀects. Furthermore, policies that target labor market outcomes
may also have feedback eﬀects on the marriage market that cannot be captured if
marriage and employment decisions are not treated as joint decisions. The policy
experiments conducted in this paper illustrate both points. For example, eliminating
the black-white gap in earnings increases the earnings potential of black men and
therefore the quality of the marital pool facing black women. However, eliminating
the racial wage gap also improves labor market opportunities and quality of black
women to such an extent that remaining single is now more attractive than it was
before the policy change. As a result, improving the labor market outcomes for blacks
serves to lower the black marriage rate in this instance.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical
model, constructed to account for the joint patterns of employment and marriage be-
havior across race and sex discussed above. In Section 3, the data used to construct
5Angrist (2002) uses changes in immigration policy in the US as a source of exogenous variation
in his study of marriage rates and sex ratios but doesn’t consider the equilibrium eﬀects of an
exogenous shock to the marriage market on future behavior.
5the sex ratios and to estimate the model is described. The three stage estimation tech-
nique used to estimate the model is outlined in Section 4. In Section 5, the estimation
results and model ﬁt are presented. Section 6 contains several policy experiments that
further illustrate the implications of the model and parameter estimates. Section 7
concludes.
2 The Model
The model builds on the work of Becker (1973), Chiappori et al. (2002) and van der
Klaauw (1996), capturing relationships between employment, marital status and the
marriage market. In every period, individuals of gender G, G ∈ {M,F}, maximize
the present discounted value of expected utility over a ﬁnite horizon through the
choice of marital and employment status. Employment opportunities are available
in every period and individuals are assumed to either work full-time in the market
or full-time at home. Marital status and employment status decisions are discrete in
nature. The combination of marital and employment status decisions is equivalent to
choosing one of four potential states: single and not working (sn), single and working
(sh), married and not working (mn), married and working (mh). Denote the choice
set for the single states Ks = {sn,sh} and the choice set for the married states
Km = {mn,mh}.
It is assumed only single individuals are in the marriage market and that marriage
opportunities may not be available in every period.6 When marriage opportunities
arrive, individuals decide to match or to remain single. Both partners must agree to
marry for a match to form. If a match is made, individuals remain married for at
least one period after which they may divorce. If agents decide to divorce, they must
remain divorced for at least one period after which they re-enter the marriage market.
The model abstracts from the process by which agents sort in the marriage market and
assumes individuals randomly meet within marriage markets segmented by known,
6This assumption is consistent with other models of matching in marriage markets (Aiyagari,
Greenwood and G¨ uner, 2000; Brien, Lillard and Stern, 2001; Drewianka, 1998; and Wong, 1997).
6exogenous characteristics. For ease of exposition, the model presented below considers
the case of one marriage market. Under the assumption that individuals cannot
choose their marriage market, the extension to several markets is straightforward and
is considered in the empirical analysis.
Five factors determine the utility gains to marriage and employment. First, indi-
viduals receive utility directly from consumption (xt) and each marital and employ-
ment state. Second, individuals receive utility from the presence of children in the
household (ct), where children are represented by an indicator equal to one if a ﬁrst
birth occurred and where the utility from children can vary depending on employ-
ment and marital status in the current period. Third, the utility from each state may
also diﬀer for individuals depending on their ﬁxed exogenous individual characteris-
tics, summarized by I possible types. Fourth, married individuals derive utility from
match-speciﬁc marital capital Lt which accumulates according to:
Lt+1 = (Lt + 1) · 1(kt ∈ Km),
where 1(·) is an indicator equal to one if the individual is in one of the married
states. Finally, utility depends on an idiosyncratic component that diﬀers depending
on current employment and marriage decisions and is uncorrelated over states, time
and individuals. The shock realized by an individual in state k and period t is denoted
²kt. It is assumed that utility is linear in ²kt and that shocks to current period utility
are observed by agents before they make employment and marriage decisions in each
period. The resulting utility function for an individual of type i and gender G in
state k and period t can be expressed as
u
G
k (xt,ct,i,Lt) + ²
G
kt, (1)
k ∈ {Ks,Km}, i ∈ I. The budget constraint is a function of two potential sources of
income in the current period, labor market earnings (wt) and non-labor income (yt)
xt = wt + yt. (2)
Labor market earnings are assumed to depend on the individual’s type and an i.i.d.
idiosyncratic component (ewt), where the shocks to current period earnings are ob-




wG(i) + ewt if k ∈ {sh,mh},
0 otherwise.
(3)
Non-labor income diﬀers depending on the current marital state to capture the notion
that diﬀerent sources of non-labor income may be available to individuals depending
on their current marital status. If single, non-labor income may also diﬀer depending
on whether the individual is working or not working. If married, the couple receives
total non-labor income ymt, where ymt is a function of exogenous characteristics of
both partners in the marriage. In each instance, non-labor income is also a function of
i.i.d. idiosyncratic components (eG
snt, eG
sht, emt) observed by agents before they make
their employment and marriage decisions in each period.
Non-labor income for married couples is divided among the partners for personal
consumption according to a rule determining intra-household transfers in the spirit
of Chiappori’s (1992) sharing rule.7 As in Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), the
income transfer depends on the current sex ratio (Rt) in the marriage market. The
transfer also depends on the potential earnings (wG) of both partners in the marriage.
The inclusion of earnings potential captures the idea that the quality of both spouses
also plays a role in determining how resources are allocated in the household. It is
assumed for simplicity that potential earnings are known by all agents in every period
and are determined by the same characteristics that determine realized earnings.
All three arguments inﬂuence intra-household allocations through their eﬀect on an
individual’s opportunities outside the current marriage. The transfer for a married





The hypothesis that men transfer more resources to women when women face better
7Within Chiappori’s (1992) general framework, it is assumed married individuals retain separate
utility functions after matching. The model abstracts from the details of the bargaining process and
requires only the assumption that intra-household allocations are Pareto eﬃcient.
8opportunities outside the marriage is consistent with a rule that is increasing in Rt.
There is no constraint on the magnitude of the intra-household transfer; therefore the






k (i) + ekt if k ∈ Ks,
φ(Rt,wF(i),wM(j)) if G = F and k ∈ Km,
ym(i,jt) + emt − φ(Rt,wF(i),wM(j)) if G = M and k ∈ Km.
(4)
In this framework, as in Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, (2002), the sex ratio aﬀects
current period employment decisions directly through its eﬀect on the intra-household
allocation of income for married couples. Through the intra-household allocation
process, the sex ratio also inﬂuences the behavior of single agents. In particular,
movements in the sex ratio alter the intra-household transfers single agents face should
they decide to marry and therefore alter the desirability of marriage.
2.1 Fertility
Children are not treated as choice variables in the model due to the complexity in-
herent in modelling fertility decisions explicitly in this framework. However, children
play important roles in employment and marital status decisions for men and women.
Therefore, it is assumed ﬁrst births arrive stochastically within the model, where the
determinants of a ﬁrst birth vary with the agent’s state in the previous period. It
is further assumed ct = 1 is an absorbing state to abstract from child mortality and
the loss of access to children through divorce. Denote ΓG
s (·) the fertility transition
function for singles. First births for individuals who were single in the previous period
depend on their exogenous characteristics, where BG
s (i,t) denotes the probability a
single person of gender G and type i experiences a ﬁrst birth in period t
Γ
G





s (ct = 1|ct−1 = 1) = 1
Γ
G





s (ct = 0|ct−1 = 1) = 0,
9In addition to the exogenous characteristics of both partners and the marital-speciﬁc
capital accumulated in the match, the probability of a birth for a married couple
depends on the past fertility status of both partners. Two childless single agents
who marry both beneﬁt from children borne in the current marriage. Further, it
is assumed that individuals do not receive utility from step-children and that step-
children do not prevent the arrival of children in the current marriage if one of the
spouses does not have children of their own. Denote Γm(·) the fertility transition
function for married couples and c0
t the fertility status of the spouse. Therefore, the
ﬁrst birth arrival process for married couples is
Γm(ct = 1,c
0
t = 1|ct−1 = 0,c
0
t−1 = 1) = Bm(i,j,t,Lt−1)
Γm(ct = 1,c
0
t = 1|ct−1 = 0,c
0





t−1) = 1 − Bm(i,j,t,Lt−1)
Γm(ct = 1,c
0
t = 1|ct−1 = 1,c
0






2.2 Marriage Market Friction
Individuals determine the utility they expect to receive in each marital and employ-
ment state as outlined above. However, it may be the case that marriage opportunities
are not available in every period. A natural way to capture this idea is to introduce
search friction in the model. In this context, the sex ratio determines the degree of
diﬃculty agents face in contacting potential partners in the marriage market. Fric-
tion in the marriage market is modeled in the spirit of Pissarides (1985), where the
total number of contacts in the marriage market (Ct) is a function of the stocks of
single men (SM
t ) and women (SF
t ) in the current period. It is assumed the contact






10which implies that all individuals in excess demand in the marriage market make a
contact in the period. The probability that an individual will be contacted in the
marriage market is equal to the total number of contacts in the marriage market








The eﬀect of the sex ratio on search friction is readily observed, as the probability
women are contacted in the marriage market is proportional to the probability men






In other words, the sex ratio measures the degree of search friction faced by women
relative to men, where a higher sex ratio translates into relatively less search friction
for women than for men.
When a contact is made in the marriage market, agents draw a spouse of type
j, j ∈ {1,2,..,I} and fertility status c0, c0 ∈ {0,1}. Let G0 denote the gender of an
agent’s spouse or potential spouse. Conditional on making a contact, the probability
of drawing a potential spouse of type j and fertility status c0 in period t is denoted
qG0
s (j,c0
t) and is simply the fraction of potential spouses of type j and fertility status c0
in the marriage market in period t. The probability of contacting a potential spouse
















For ease of exposition, preferences are expressed in terms of the reduced form utility
corresponding to each state in the following sections.8 The reduced form utility for
8Appendix A contains further details on the reduced form representation of the model.
11each agent, denoted UG
k (·), varies depending on whether the agent is currently married
or single; in particular, the transfer received by a currently married individual depends









k (i,ct) + εG
kt if k ∈ Ks
e UG
k (i,j,ct,Rt,Lt) + εG
kt if k ∈ Km,
where the stochastic component of utility in the reduced form for state k (εG
kt) is a
function of the random components of utility, earnings and non-labor income.
Given the speciﬁcation for current period utility and search friction in the marriage
market, it is of interest to consider the discounted expected utility of each alternative
available to individuals when they make their employment and marital status deci-
sions in every period. Let Ωt denote the information set for an individual in period
t. The information set in period t contains information on exogenous characteris-
tics of men and women in the marriage market, the stock of marital-speciﬁc capital,
the spouse’s fertility status if married, and the current sex ratio and the stochastic
components of utility in reduced form. Note that the value function for the single
states depends only on the individual’s type; the value function for the married states
depends on the individual’s type as well as their spouse’s type. The value function is
denoted V G






kt(Ωt,i,ct) if k ∈ Ks
e V G
kt(Ωt,i,j,ct) if k ∈ Km.
The present discounted value of utility in state k can be then expressed as the sum
of current period utility, given the realized value of the shocks in t, and the expected
discounted value of future utility. The value function for a single agent of type i and
fertility status c is
e V
G
kt(Ωt,i,ct) = e U
G




t+1(Ωt+1,i,ct+1)|kt ∈ Ks], (7)
where discount factor is denoted β, and the value function for an agent of type i and
fertility status c, married to a spouse of type j is
e V
G
kt(Ωt,i,j,ct) = e U
G




t+1(Ωt+1,i,ct+1)|kt ∈ Km]. (8)
12The expectations in (7) and (8) are taken with respect to the stochastic components
of utility in t + 1 and with respect to the realization of next period’s choice set. The










t+1(Ωt+1,i,1) if ct = 1,
BG(i,t)V G
t+1(Ωt+1,i,1)
+(1 − BG(i,t))V G







s (i,t) if kt−1 ∈ Ks
Bm(i,j,t,Lt) if kt−1 ∈ Km
The value of being single for an individual of type i is deﬁned as
e V
G


















One important feature of the model is that individuals take into account the
likelihood of being accepted as a mate while single should they meet someone in the
marriage market or, if currently married, of continuing to be accepted by their current
spouse. This feature of the model is captured as follows. Deﬁne an indicator function






1 if e V G
mt(Ωt,i,j,ct) ≥ e V G
st (Ωt,i,ct)
0 otherwise,
which yields a more explicit form for the value functions on the right hand side of
(7) and (8) as follows. Consider ﬁrst agents who are single in t. If an agent of type i
makes a contact in the marriage market with a potential spouse that wants to marry,
the agent can choose among all four possible states. If the potential spouse does not
want to marry or if no contact was made in the marriage market, agents must remain

























































Agents of type i who chose to be married in t are not in the marriage market in t+1.
If their type j spouse is still alive and wants to remain married, individuals must
decide whether to work and whether to remain with their current spouse. Individuals
remain single and can only choose their employment status if they are exogenously




































The solution to the model outlined above is based on a set of reservation values,
determined by individuals as follows. At the beginning of every period, individuals
realize their current choice sets and the shocks to utility, wages and non-labor income.
Once realized, it is possible to compute the value of each employment and marital
status combination in the period t choice set. Individuals then choose the state
yielding the highest level of utility.
The sequence of reservation values that form the solution to the problem faced by
individuals in every period can be expressed in terms of the stochastic component of
utility. For every state k ,k ∈ {sh,mn,mh}, deﬁne εG∗
kt such that individuals would




like to choose state k for values of εG
snt −εG
kt below εG∗
kt . Deﬁne an indicator (dG
kt) that
14is equal to one if state k is chosen by an individual of gender G in period t and 0
otherwise; εG∗
kt is the value such that
U
G















Now consider two possible states, k,l ∈ Kt, where Kt is the choice set available to
the agent in the current period. State k is preferred to l if the value of choosing state





















The latter can be rewritten in terms of the reservation and realized values for the
























The sex ratio evolves endogenously in the model, as the current marital status deci-
sions of all the agents determine the sex ratio in the next period. Current marital
status decisions depend on future conditions in the marriage market. Therefore, in-
dividuals must determine the value of the sex ratio in the next period when choosing
their employment and marital status in the current period. The stocks of single men
15and women in the marriage market in period t + 1 are a function of the ﬂows in and
out of the marriage market in the current period and are composed of two groups: the
number of single agents in t that did not make a match and the number of married
agents who divorce. The stock of singles with fertility status c and of type i at the































































i,j ∈ {1,2,..,I} and c,c0 ∈ {0,1}. The stock of married couples with exogenous
types i,j and fertility status c,c0 in t is denoted Mt(i,j,ct,c0
t) and qm(i,j,ct,c0
t) is the
exogenous fraction of individuals of type i and fertility status c married to spouses










t) = 1. The
stock of singles is allowed to vary by ∆G
s (i,ct), which is speciﬁc to gender, year, type
and fertility status. This feature is introduced to allow for exogenous diﬀerences in
mortality and incarceration rates across diﬀerent groups in the population and to
match the exogenous diﬀerences in the aggregate stocks observed in the data. For
simplicity, it is assumed that only the stock of singles, not married couples, changes
exogenously over time.
The stock of married individuals in period t + 1 is the sum of the number of
























































16The total stock of single agents in the marriage market is the sum of the stocks of





































respectively. Finally, the sex ratio in period t+1 is deﬁned as the ratio of single men







The above relations describe the manner in which the marriage market evolves over
time. Marital status decisions in the current period depend on the value of the sex
ratio in the following period and the value of the sex ratio in t+1 is determined by the
marital status decisions made by individuals in the current period. In equilibrium,
it must be the case that the stocks and sex ratio described by (13), (15) and (18)
along with the type probabilities (16) and (17) are used by agents in evaluating the
individual’s problem. In other words, equilibrium requires that the decisions of all
the agents in t generate values of Rt+1, qG
s (i,ct+1) and qm(i,j,ct+1,c0
t+1) that are
consistent with the marital status decisions made by all men and women today.
3 Data
In order to estimate the model outlined above, it is necessary to employ a data set
where individuals can be followed over time from the point they enter the marriage
market. The NLSY79, a sample of 12,686 men and women who are between the
17ages of 14 and 22 in 1979, is well suited for this purpose. The composition of the
sample allows one to follow a large group of individuals for up to 18 years from ages
at which they enter the marriage market. The following restrictions are placed on
the sample. First, individuals in the military and Hispanics are removed. Second,
to accurately capture marital status transitions, observations following a break in an
individual’s history, as well as observations with missing or inconsistent information,
are removed.9 After restricting the age range in the sample as outlined below, the
resulting sample size is 5,295 in 1979.
The NLSY79 sample is used to construct marital and employment status, as well
as measures of labor market earnings and non-labor incomes, for use in estimation.
An individual is deﬁned as married if they are currently married or cohabiting and
the marital history is constructed using annual information on marital status at the
interview date in every year. Starting and ending dates of relationships are not used
to construct the marital histories because this information is not available in all years
for cohabitors.10 As a result, some spells may be missed and the length of some spells
may be measured inaccurately.11 In particular, individuals who report being married
or common-law in two consecutive periods are treated as if they are in the same
relationship in both periods; in some instances it may be the case that the individual
reports two distinct relationships that are treated as one relationship. Despite its
shortcomings, this approach is used so that the deﬁnitions of marital status and the
measurement of transitions are consistent across the years and across cohabitations
and marriages. This does not appear to be a serious cause for concern, as only 135
person-year observations reported more than one marriage from one interview date
to the next over the 1979 to 1996 sample period.12
9Individuals with only one valid observation are also removed.
10Information on the starting date of cohabitations, on whether individuals lived with their spouses
before marriage and whether the respondent lived with their spouse continuously before marriage is
only available in 1990 and 1992-1996. In the remaining years, information on current cohabitation
status, but not changes in status between interviews, is available in every year.
11It is assumed marital status in 1978 is single for all respondents, thus the durations for some
marriages may be measured inaccurately for this reason as well. However, the low marriage rates in
1979 suggest this assumption only aﬀects a small number of matches.
12It is important to emphasize that this ﬁgure includes cohabitations at, but not between, interview
18Employment status is measured by an indicator equal to one if individuals worked
at least 775 hours in the interview year and zero otherwise. This measure thus includes
individuals working at least 15 hours per week or at least 20 full time weeks per year.13
Earnings are measured as annual income from wages, salaries and tips.14 Non-labor
income in this instance covers a broad range of categories, including farm income,
unemployment beneﬁts, alimony and child support. Income from social programs such
as AFDC, food stamps, other public assistance and Supplement Security Income (SSI)
is also included in non-labor income. In addition, income from other persons, veterans
pay, workers compensation and disability beneﬁts is included in non-labor income.
The aforementioned sources of income are all included in order to maintain consistency
over the sample period, as non-labor income is grouped in wide categories in the early
years of the sample.15 Earnings and non-labor income are subsequently converted to
real terms, where 1981 is the base year. Educational attainment is measured by
an indicator equal to 1 if respondents have at least a high school education and 0
otherwise. Regional indicators for the northeast, south and western portions of the
U.S. are deﬁned. An indicator equal to 1 when children are present and 0 otherwise is
also deﬁned. In the empirical speciﬁcation, time is measured in terms of the number
of years the individual has been in the marriage market. Finally, a race indicator
equal to 1 if the respondent is black and 0 if white is constructed.
Table 1 contains sample statistics by race and sex for selected years in the panel.
The data illustrate several interesting patterns. Starting with the empirical evidence
dates. It is likely the number of cohabitations between interview dates is greater than the number of
marriages, given the relative ease with which cohabitations can be dissolved and the greater stability
of marriages as compared to cohabitations. See Brien, Lillard and Stern (2001) for a more complete
discussion of these issues. It is also possible that relationships are missed in the marital history if an
individual was single at two consecutive interview dates but married or cohabited between interview
dates.
13Employment status is not available for individuals under the age of 16 and for a small number
of 17 year olds in the NLSY79. This should not pose a problem in estimation as the vast majority of
such individuals are enrolled in school full-time and are unlikely to have annual hours in the labor
market above 775.
14The bottom of the earnings distribution is trimmed at the 5% level.
15In particular, for individuals not meeting any of a set of criteria (18 years and older, has child,
enrolled in college, married or living outside their parent’s home), all income with the exception of
earnings and unemployment compensation is grouped in one category.
19regarding children, black women are more likely than whites and black men to have
an early birth. The fact that the birth rates for black men tend to be quite low
despite the high birth rates for black women suggests the presence of many black
single mothers. There also exist large diﬀerences in earnings across race and sex.
White women have higher labor market earnings than black women by 1996 despite
the similarities in educational attainment and fertility. In contrast to the ﬁndings
regarding earnings, black women tend to have the highest levels of non-labor income
in the latter years in the sample, likely due to the high participation rates in social
assistance programs of black women relative to white women.
Marriage rates also tend to diﬀer widely across race: the fraction of married men
and women in the sample is consistently higher for whites than for blacks across the
sample period. Within race, black women are less likely to be married than black
men, while the converse holds for whites. Turning to the trends in employment rates,
men are more likely to work than women within each racial group as expected. In
the initial sample period, it appears whites are more likely to work than blacks: by
1996, there remains a substantial gap in the employment rates of black and white
men, although the employment rates for women across race are quite similar. Table 2
contains employment rates by race and marital status for men and women in the
1996 cross-section. Comparing employment rates across race and marital status for
men and women illustrates several interesting trends. The data suggest married
white females have lower employment rates than their single counterparts, while the
opposite trend emerges for black women. For men, whites tend to work more than
blacks and married men tend to work more than single men. The diﬀerences in
employment rates for men across race stand in contrast to the pattern for women,
where black married women have higher employment rates than white married women.
It is next of interest to consider how the cross-sectional diﬀerences in employment and
marriage rates across race and sex relate to the trends in the sex ratio. To answer
this question, it is necessary to determine an appropriate measure of outside marriage
market opportunities.
203.1 Measurement of the Marriage Markets
In constructing sex ratios for the empirical analysis, I attempt to measure the mar-
riage market for this recent cohort in a way that is suﬃciently narrow so that an
accurate measure is captured, yet suﬃciently wide so as to minimize the degree to
which individuals may be matching outside their speciﬁed market in the data. For
simplicity, the marriage market is segmented by age, region and race in the empirical
analysis.16,17 The sample is subsequently limited to women aged 15 to 19 in 1979 and
men aged 17 to 21, an age range that is suﬃciently wide to minimize the number of
individuals who match outside the chosen age range but suﬃciently narrow so that
the age groupings included in the ﬁrst year of the marriage market can be considered
exogenous.18 Measures of the marriage market are also limited to single agents, as
consistent with the model outlined below.
Once the marriage market is segmented by age, region and race, I re-weight the
NLSY79 sampling weights such that the stocks of single and married men and women
in each marriage market and year match the corresponding stocks in the Current
Population Survey (CPS), and I construct measures of the stocks of single men and
women in each market using the revised weights.19 The NLSY79 sampling weights
are re-weighted using the CPS because the weighting scheme in the NLSY79 may not
be representative of the population in terms of age, sex, race and marital status and
16With regard to age, data from the NLSY79 suggest men tend to be older than their spouses by
2 to 3 years on average, with 90% marrying women who are less than three years older and seven
years younger. It should be noted that age diﬀerences across men and women narrowed slightly over
the same period the sex ratio declined. The median age at marriage for men is 23 and for women is
20 in 1950; in 1990 the median ages at marriage are 26 and 24 for men and women, respectively.
17Data from the Census indicate the strong presence of sorting on race: in 1980, 0.2% of all
marriages in the U.S. were between black men and white women and 0.1% are between white
men and black women. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Report, Series P20-509,
“Household Characteristics: March 1997,” and earlier reports.
18The NLSY79 contains limited sample sizes for individuals aged 14 and 22 in the data, making
the use of a wider age category unattractive.
19In an eﬀort to match the CPS data to the NLSY79 data as closely as possible, individuals serving
in the military are excluded from the CPS for the construction of the weights. Since data are not
available on cohabitors for the majority of years in the CPS, individuals who are cohabiting in the
NLSY79 are treated as single for the purposes of assigning CPS weights but are treated as married
in the construction of the stocks once the NLSY79 has been reweighted.
21because attrition in the NLSY79 may result in mismeasurement of the stocks of single
men and women in the marriage markets over time. In contrast to previous studies,
I do not segment the marriage market further because of sample size limitations. In
particular, the individual transitions in the NLSY79 data are used to measure changes
in the sex ratio over time. The limited size of the panel therefore limits the degree to
which the market can be segmented.
Based on the above assumptions, sex ratios are constructed for each marriage
market as illustrated in Figure 1. Substantial diﬀerences exist in the initial sex ratios
in 1979, where the sex ratio is approximately equal to 1 for whites and equal to 0.8
for blacks. The exception is the southern US, where the sex ratios are substantially
below 1 for both demographic groups. The diﬀerences continue to widen over time
as individuals ﬂow out of the marriage market into relationships. Interestingly, the
sex ratio for blacks tends to decrease over time, while the opposite trend emerges
for whites. For blacks, the decline in the sex ratio over time reﬂects diﬀerences
in mortality and incarceration rates across black men and women. For whites, the
increase in the sex ratio is due in part to the larger inﬂux of male immigrants to the
U.S. as compared to females within recent decades.20
The diﬀerences in the sex ratio across race tend to coincide with the diﬀerences in
employment and marriage rates over the same period, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
In general, the data indicate that those groups facing low sex ratios tend to have lower
marriage and higher employment rates. For example, the marriage rates for white
females are highest in the northwest of the United States, the region where the white
sex ratio is greatest. The marriage rates for white women are higher than for white
men in all regions with a high white sex ratio: only in the northeast, with a sex ratio
near 1, are the marriage rates the same. With the exception of the west, black males
have higher marriage rates than black females, consistent with the low sex ratios in all
the regional black marriage markets. In terms of employment, the gap in employment
rates across white men and white women is smallest in the northeast, where the sex
20U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Report, Series P20-486, “Foreign-Born Popula-
tion: March 1994”.
22ratio is relatively low; in the south and northwest, the gap in employment rates
for whites is as high as 40% in some instances. In general, black males have higher
employment rates than black females, but the gap in employment rates between black
males and females narrows considerably as the sex ratio deteriorates for black women.
In the following section, a model of employment and marriage is presented that can
account for the diﬀerences in behavior across diﬀerent groups within this cohort.
4 Econometric Speciﬁcation
I estimate the structural parameters of the model using the three-stage estimation
procedure of van der Klaauw (1996). In the ﬁrst stage of estimation, the reduced
form choice probabilities are derived from the solution to the dynamic programming
problem and are jointly estimated with fertility using maximum likelihood. In the
second stage, seven earnings and non-labor income equations are estimated as spec-
iﬁed by (3) and (4). In particular, an earnings equation for each gender, non-labor
income equations in the single, not-working and single working states for each gender
and a non-labor income equation for married couples are estimated. In the ﬁnal stage
of estimation, the structural parameters of the model are recovered from the fertility
and reduced form choice probabilities in combination with the earnings and non-labor
income equations using a minimum distance estimator.
The primary advantage of the three stage method is the computational ease with
which earnings and non-labor income are incorporated in estimation. It is necessary
to estimate earnings and non-labor income equations for men and women: under van
der Klaauw’s (1996) approach, all seven equations can be estimated independently
of the dynamic model. To do so, I assume the idiosyncratic components of earnings
(ewt) and non-labor income (ekt) are linear in the reduced form choice probability
errors (εkt).21 Alternatively, if the model is estimated using full-information maximum
likelihood, it is necessary to specify the joint distribution of the seven non-labor
income and earnings equations, the two fertility probabilities for individuals and the
21See Dubin and McFadden (1984) and van der Klaauw (1996) for further details.
23choice probability errors. Therefore, while the three stage estimator does impose
assumptions regarding the form of the underlying errors, it is likely they are no more
restrictive than the more demanding approach where assumptions are imposed on the
underlying errors directly.
Before proceeding with estimation, the following functional forms are assigned to
















where the γ’s are utility conversion factors.22 The sharing rule is speciﬁed as a linear
function of the ratio of single men to women in the marriage market and the potential









The parameters in the sharing rule can be interpreted as the change in the dollar value
of the transfer resulting from a unit change in the corresponding argument. Finally,
earnings and non-labor incomes are speciﬁed as linear functions of exogenous indi-
vidual characteristics and the random components of earnings and non-labor income
in each state, respectively.
4.1 Estimation of the Choice Probabilities and Fertility
The reduced form choice probabilities are estimated according to the optimal policy
described by (12). Assuming the composite errors in period t are distributed i.i.d.
extreme value,23 the probability of choosing state k, conditional on choice set Kt, for
22The utility from children, consumption, and exogenous characteristics while single and not




interpreted as the utility from children when in states sh,mn and mh, respectively, relative to




interpreted in an analogous fashion. Furthermore, γF
xsh, γM
xsh, γM
xmh are normalized to one for
identiﬁcation purposes.
23This assumption is commonly imposed in the estimation of dynamic discrete choice models, as
it implies a convenient closed form solution for the choice probabilities. See van der Klaauw (1996),
Rust (1987), and Berkovec and Stern (1991) for examples. Appendix A describes the expressions
relating the composite errors to the underlying shocks to utility, earnings and non-labor income.
24an individual of type i can be expressed as
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Information on the respondent’s race, the presence of children, education, region of
residence, year in the marriage market and spousal education if married is used to
estimate the reduced form choice probabilities.
Individuals are married if they choose state mn or state mh. Therefore, the



























t+1(Ωt+1,i,ct+1 = 1) if ct = 1
BG(i,t)V G
t+1(Ωt+1,i,ct+1 = 1)
+(1 − BG(i,t))V G
t+1(Ωt+1,i,ct+1 = 0) if ct = 0.
The problem faced by potential spouses is identical to that faced by individuals of
the same gender in the sample. Therefore, the same characteristics (region, children,
education of the potential spouses, education of the individual) that determine the
individual choice probabilities determine the acceptance probabilities of the potential
spouse.24
The probability an agent of gender G experiences a ﬁrst birth in period t is logis-
tically distributed, where the set of variables assumed to determine fertility includes
the number of years since the agent initially entered the marriage market, race, ed-
ucation, and marital-speciﬁc capital if married. The incorporation of state-speciﬁc
24The implicit assumption being made is that both spouses share the same household (in the same
region) after marriage. It is also assumed that individuals and spouses do not receive utility from
step-children.
25utility from children and ﬁrst birth arrivals captures, albeit in a limited way, the no-
tion that fertility and marital status decisions are inter-related. Annual data on the
presence of children is used to identify the parameters in the ﬁrst birth probabilities













for single individuals and
Bm(i,j,t,Lt−1) =
exp(λ0m + λimi + λjmj + λtmt + λLLt−1)
1 + exp(λ0m + λimi + λjmj + λtmt + λLLt−1)
for married couples.
The probability of choosing state k in period t for an individual of type i is thus
a function of the probability of contacting a potential spouse in the marriage market,
the probability that the current or potential spouse ﬁnds the individual acceptable
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where Θ is the vector of reduced form parameters from the model.
264.2 Estimation of Earnings and Non-Labor Income
The estimation of earnings and non-labor income for individuals, spouses and poten-
tial spouses constitutes the second stage of estimation. The samples used to estimate
the earnings and non-labor income equations depend upon the employment and mar-
ital status decisions of each individual. Earnings are only observed for labor market
participants and thus are estimated on samples of working individuals only. The
samples used to estimate non-labor income are also state dependent, since non-labor
incomes are only observed in the data for individuals occupying a particular state. To
control for the bias that may result from the use of non-random samples, non-labor
income and earnings equations are selection-corrected in estimation using the choice
probabilities obtained in the ﬁrst stage.25
Earnings and non-labor income equations are estimated for men and women as
well as for their spouses if married or potential spouses if single. The vector of
characteristics that determine earnings for individuals include region of residence
indicators, race, education and the number of years since the individual ﬁrst entered
the marriage market.26 The vector of characteristics determining non-labor income
is the same as that determining earnings with the addition of children, included to
capture diﬀerences in the availability of social programs that depend on the presence
of children, and spousal education if married. The coeﬃcients in the earnings and
non-labor income equations are identiﬁed by the data on earnings and non-labor
income, respectively. Note that the sex ratio and spousal education enter the choice
probabilities, and therefore the selection correction terms, but do not directly enter
the earnings and non-labor income equations.
25A similar approach is implemented in Dubin and McFadden (1984).
26For full details regarding the estimation of the earnings and non-labor income equations, see
Appendix B.
274.3 Estimation of the Structural Parameters
In the ﬁnal stage of estimation, parameter estimates from the ﬁrst two stages are used
to obtain consistent estimates of the structural parameters of the model (Ψ). The
combined system of reduced form choice probabilities, earnings, non-labor income and
fertility probabilities results in a set of moment conditions relating the reduced form
parameters to the structural parameters. Generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimation is used to recover the structural parameters from the just-identiﬁed system.
In particular, the structural parameters are estimated as
b Ψ = argmin
Ψ
[b Θ − g(Ψ)] ´ W
−1[b Θ − g(Ψ)],
where g is the set of moment conditions imposing the restrictions between the reduced
form and structural parameters of the model and b Θ is the vector of reduced form
parameters. The weighting matrix W is estimated using estimates of the covariance
matrices from the ﬁrst two stages in estimation and the outer-products of the ﬁrst






where G is a matrix of derivatives of the moment conditions, G = ∂g(b Ψ)/∂Ψ0, and
√
N(b Ψ − Ψ) →
D n[0,Σ]. (20)
The preference parameters are identiﬁed as follows. Comparing the utility from
the single, non-working state to each of the remaining states identiﬁes the parame-
ters representing the utility from exogenous characteristics, children, marital-speciﬁc




k , k ∈ {sh,mn,mh}). For identi-
ﬁcation purposes, the consumption parameters for the single working states (γG
xsh)
and for one of the married states for one of the spouses (γM
xmh) are normalized to
1. The utility from the spouse’s education in the married, not working state is also
normalized to zero. Comparing the utility from the married, non-working state to the
27For full details, see the Appendix and van der Klaauw (1996).
28single, non-working state identiﬁes the parameters in the sharing rule (φR,φM,φF).
The sharing rule parameters are identiﬁed by the assumption that the male earnings
potential only enters the female’s utility function through intra-household transfers
and likewise for females. Similarly, the parameter φR is identiﬁed by assuming that
the sex ratio only inﬂuences utility directly through the sharing rule. Data are not
available on rejections and acceptances of oﬀers by both potential spouses in a match;
however, the symmetry inherent in the two-sided model implies the same parameters
that determine the utility from each state also determine the probabilities potential
spouses want to marry.
As a ﬁnal note before preceding to estimation, it should be mentioned that the
equilibrium conditions are not imposed during estimation due to the extra computa-
tional costs imposed by doing so. In particular, imposing the equilibrium conditions
entails solving for the equilibrium values of the sex ratio and proportions of singles
and married couples of each type in the model between every iteration over the pa-
rameter estimates. However, when policy experiments are conducted using the model,




The model presented above is estimated for the time period covering 1979 to 1994,28
under the assumption the discount factor is equal to 0.95 so as to capture the forward-
looking behavior of agents.29,30 The estimated parameters determining the size of the
intra-household transfer are presented in Table 3. Regarding the eﬀects of earnings
potential on the intra-household allocation process, the ﬁndings are consistent with
28For the purposes of this paper, 1994 is treated as the terminal period. To extend the time
horizon, it is necessary to construct stocks of single agents using the equilibrium ﬂow conditions for
the years beyond the end of the sampling period.
29The estimates did not converge when attempts were made to estimate the discount factor.
30Parameter estimates from the reduced form models are presented in Appendix C.
29those of Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002). In particular, the results predict that
an increase of $1.00 in the potential earnings of the wife results in a decrease in
transfers from her spouse by approximately $0.34, while an equivalent increase in
the potential earnings of her spouse induces an increase in transfers to the female of
$0.22. Considering the signs of the sharing rule parameters, Chiappori et al. (2002)
interpret the results as evidence of altruism within married couples.
It is worth emphasizing the ﬁnding that increases in the earnings potential of
husbands and wives have opposing eﬀects on transfers within the household. One
implication of this result is that the probability a match forms between any two agents
is decreasing in the diﬀerence between their potential earnings, a result consistent with
positive sorting on earnings potential. More speciﬁcally, the transfers paid by spouses
with higher earnings potential increase as the gap in earnings potential across the
husband and wife increases. If the transfer paid by the high income spouse becomes
suﬃciently large, the probability that the utility from being single exceeds that from
being married increases. As a result, the estimation results predict matches between
spouses with low potential earnings and high potential earnings are less likely to form,
consistent with the notion that quality matters in the marital sorting process.
The parameter estimate for the sex ratio in the transfer rule indicates that a
10% increase in the sex ratio increases annual transfers to the female by $230 or
approximately 16% of average non-labor marital income. This result is consistent with
the interpretation that more favorable opportunities in the marriage market translate
into greater bargaining power within the marriage. The results are also indicative of
the relationship between the labor market and the marriage market, as an increase
in the sex ratio has the expected income eﬀect on the employment decisions of both
household members. Although it is diﬃcult to make direct comparisons between
the two frameworks, the eﬀect of the sex ratio on the distribution of income within
married households in this paper appears consistent qualitatively with the results of
Chiappori et al. (2002).31
31The model of Chiappori et al. (2002) is estimated on a sample of married couples in which both
partners worked from the 1988 wave of the PSID. The sex ratio in their analysis was measured at
30Together, the parameter estimates translate into average annual transfers of $1,945
and $2,151 to black and white women, respectively. The transfer received by a woman
in the average household is composed of non-labor income and spousal labor market
earnings, as average transfers to married women exceed total non-labor income by
$1,299 and $1,204 for black and white men, respectively. The diﬀerences across males
and females in intra-household transfers reﬂect diﬀerences in earnings potential across
sex and the higher level of non-labor income available to single women relative to
single men through programs such as AFDC. The fact that the average married male
is predicted to pay part of his labor earnings to his spouse provides one explanation
for the lower marriage rates in the black population relative to the white population.32
If labor market earnings are lower for black males, as observed from Table 1, then
marriage may be less desirable for black males simply because the transfer necessary
to form a match is quite costly. Black women, alternatively, may not be willing to
accept a lower transfer because their outside option of remaining single may be more
attractive if the marital transfer becomes suﬃciently low. The latter is reﬂected in
Table 4, as black women are predicted to reject 43% of contacts in the marriage
market. Both channels help explain the joint pattern of marriage and employment
diﬀerences across sex and race in the data.
The relationship between marriage market conditions and marital behavior across
race is further exacerbated by the fact that black women ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to
contact a spouse than white women. The average contact probabilities over the
sample period, constructed from the stocks of single males and females in the CPS
according to (5) and (6), indicate the presence of substantial search friction, with
relatively higher friction faced by those with poor marriage market opportunities. In
particular, Table 4 indicates there is a larger spread in contact rates across sex for
blacks than for whites. This is a direct result of the greater imbalance in marriage
market conditions for blacks: it is predicted that 20% of single black women are
the state level and other factors, including variation in divorce laws, were included in the sharing
rule.
32In fact, approximately 10% of married men in the sample would be unable to pay the transfer
predicted by the model.
31unable to make a contact in the marriage market over the course of a year.
A further determinant of the relatively low marriage rates of blacks can be ob-
served upon examination of the estimated preference parameters in Table 5.33 In
particular, black women receive signiﬁcantly less utility from marriage than white
women. This result is consistent with previous studies that consider racial diﬀerences
in marital behavior (Brien, 1997; Brien, Lillard and Stern, 2001). In contrast, there
are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in preferences over marriage for black and white men.
The diﬀerences in marriage behavior of black men can therefore be attributed to the
diﬀerences in socio-economic characteristics and diﬀerences in marriage and labor
market opportunities.
Regarding the remaining preference parameters, women prefer marriage to remain-
ing single, while men prefer not working to working. The latter is consistent with
receiving disutility from leisure as expected. Interestingly, the utility from marital-
speciﬁc capital is much higher for men than for women. A commonly cited beneﬁt of
marriage is specialization of labor within the household, where women tend to devote
more time to home production than men. For this reason, an increase in marital-
speciﬁc capital for women likely represents a penalty of investing in human capital
for home versus market production, as the former may not provide as many beneﬁts
outside the marriage as the latter. This pattern in the data may be consistent with a
more general model, where men and women can choose whether to specialize in home
versus market production.
Turning to the preference parameters for children, single working men and women
receive less utility from children relative to the single, non-working state, likely re-
ﬂecting the time costs of child rearing. It is also of interest to consider the eﬀect of
marital status on the probability of a ﬁrst birth for men and women. The parameter
estimates for the ﬁrst birth probabilities are presented in Table 6. In particular, the
eﬀect of many of the determinants of ﬁrst births diﬀer depending on an individual’s
marital status. Educated men and women are more likely to have children while
33The parameter estimates for region, year and education are presented in Appendix D.
32married and less likely to have children while single. Black men and women are more
likely to experience a ﬁrst birth while single, relative to whites, and are less likely to
experience a ﬁrst birth while married. Both ﬁndings highlight an interesting avenue
for extending the model in future work.
5.2 Model Fit
A comparison of the employment and marriage rates generated by the model to those
observed in the data provides an assessment of the performance of the model. A
simulated sample of 5,000 individuals is created and the simulated and actual em-
ployment and marriage rates by race and sex are compared in Figures 4 and 5. The
simulated employment rates match the employment rates in the data quite closely,
although the simulated employment rates are slightly higher than the actual employ-
ment rates during the ﬁrst few years of the sample period for white men and during
the last few years for white women. Where the model does not match the data as
well, however, is the marriage rates. First, the model over-predicts the proportion of
married men and women in the early years in the marriage market. The youngest
women and men in the sample are 15 and 17 years of age in the ﬁrst year of the mar-
riage market, respectively, and as such are primarily enrolled in school and unlikely
to form a match. Although the model has diﬃculty accounting for the relatively slow
transition to marriage for males in the early years, it is able to match the marriage
rates for whites quite well in the remaining years.
Second, the model tends to over-predict the marriage rates for blacks over the en-
tire sample period, suggesting the model is not suﬃciently ﬂexible to closely capture
marriage trends across time for both marriage markets. Two factors in particular
may be important in explaining the ﬁt of the model in this respect. First, education
is measured as an indicator equal to 1 if individuals attained at least a high school
education. As indicated in Table 1, the high school completion rates for blacks and
whites are roughly equal by 1996. However, the proportion of individuals with some
post-secondary education is substantially higher for whites than for blacks. In par-
33ticular, the fraction of women (men) with some post-secondary schooling, conditional
on high school graduation, is 62% (59%) for whites as compared to 56% (49%) for
blacks. Educational attainment is an important component of quality in the mar-
riage market. A richer speciﬁcation for education that more accurately captures the
educational diﬀerences across race may therefore improve the ability of the model to
ﬁt the black marriage rates. The second factor is the eﬀect of out-of-wedlock child-
bearing on marriage rates. Evidence from the literature indicates the prevalence of
single parenthood is greatest among black females relative to all other groups in the
population (DaVanzo and Rahman, 1993) and that children from past relationships
reduce the likelihood of future marriage (Bennett, Bloom and Miller, 1995). As such,
blacks may have lower marriage rates due to the greater incidence of lone parents in
the black population. Allowing preferences over marriage to depend on whether chil-
dren are carried into new relationships may further improve the ability of the model
to explain the black-white marriage diﬀerential.
As mentioned earlier, the equilibrium conditions are not imposed during estima-
tion. Therefore, it is of interest to consider whether the simulated marriage market
conditions match the aggregate sex ratios in the data. Figure 6 indicates that the
model tends to underestimate the sex ratios for both the black and white marriage
markets. For whites, this ﬁnding is due to the fact that the model over-predicts
marriage rates at the beginning of the sample period when the aggregate sex ratio is
relatively low. Alternatively for blacks, the gap between the simulated and actual sex
ratio remains constant over the most of the sample period, as the model over-predicts
marriage rates to roughly the same extent for black men and women over the entire
sample period.
6 Policy Experiments
In this section, a number of simulations are performed to further explore the implica-
tions of the parameter estimates and to consider several policy experiments designed
to inﬂuence employment and family structure. Each is conducted on a simulated
34sample of 5,000 men and women and compared to a baseline speciﬁcation that has
the same sample proportions by race, sex, education and region as in the data. It
should be emphasized that the policy experiments are equilibrium policy experiments:
in other words, the sex ratios and proportions of men and women of each type and
fertility status in the marriage market, as described by (13) to (18), are endogenous
in each of the simulations presented below.
6.1 The Wilson hypothesis revisited
As mentioned in the introduction, a hypothesis raised by Wilson and Neckerman
(1986) and Wilson (1990) in the literature on racial diﬀerences in the U.S. marriage
markets is that marriage rates are lower in the black marriage market because black
women face a deﬁcit of marriageable men. In particular, many black men have char-
acteristics, such as lower levels of educational attainment, that limit their desirability
as spouses. Combined with the higher mortality and incarceration rates for black
males than for other groups in the population, black men are in excess demand in the
marriage market. If blacks matched in a market that had the same characteristics as
the white marriage market, would black marriage rates be similar to those of whites?
To answer this question, the following model simulation is performed. The black
population is given the same number of men and women as in the white population
and the same distribution of characteristics. For example, the average educational
attainment for black males and females are the same as for their white counterparts,
while the preference parameters, transfer rule, and the earnings proﬁles are kept the
same as in the baseline economy. The results of this exercise, presented in Figure 7,
suggest that providing blacks with the same marriage market opportunities as whites
serves only to lower the marriage rate and employment rates for the black population.
Two underlying forces are behind the decline in marriage rates within the esti-
mated model. The ﬁrst is that the higher sex ratio for blacks implies less search
friction for black women who are searching in the marriage market. As search be-
comes easier, women meet potential spouses with a higher likelihood than before.
35Black females are therefore more likely to delay marriage and to wait for a better op-
portunity in the future. Second, although the socio-economic characteristics of black
males now match those of whites, it is still the case that the labor market opportu-
nities of black males in terms of earnings potential are still less favorable than for
white males. In particular, the parameter estimates of the earnings equations sug-
gest, holding all other characteristics constant, black males earn $3,210 less per year
than white males.34 Black females earn less than white females, but the black-white
earnings gap for women is much less than that for men. Combined with the fact
that the characteristics and opportunities of black women have improved, it is more
diﬃcult than before for black males to make marriage an attractive alternative for
black women.
It is also of interest to observe the trend in the sex ratio over time for blacks as
compared to whites in the baseline speciﬁcation at the bottom of Figure 7. Recall,
whites and blacks face the same aggregate stocks and proportions of men and women
of each type in the population in this exercise. However, the trends in the sex ratio
are dramatically diﬀerent across blacks and whites. The reason the sex ratio increases
faster for whites is because the marriage rates for whites are higher. As a result, the
slight imbalance in the aggregate sex ratio for whites translates into a very large
imbalance in the ratio of single men to single women.
The above exercise has interesting implications for policy analysis. Programs
aimed to increase the educational attainments of black youths, or to reduce black
mortality and incarceration rates, might be proposed as policy prescriptions designed
to address the Wilson hypothesis. However, it is unlikely that such policies would
improve the situation for only one side of the marriage market: black men and women
would both beneﬁt from most policy measures. This simulation shows that such
policies may have unintended consequences for the marriage market, highlighting the
importance of equilibrium eﬀects in this setting.
34See Appendix D.
366.2 Black-White diﬀerences in labor market earnings
The earnings equations suggest that black males and females earn $3,210 and $1,456,
respectively, less than whites with the same characteristics. If blacks with the same
observable characteristics as whites received the same earnings, what would happen
to marriage and employment behavior? In this experiment, the composition of the
black population remains the same as in the baseline speciﬁcation, but the earnings
proﬁles are constrained to look the same for blacks as for whites. This experiment
is implemented by setting the black indicators in the earnings equations to zero for
men and women.35
The elimination of the black-white wage gap also reduces marriage rates for blacks,
as indicated in Figure 8, because of the manner in which intra-household transfers
respond to the change in labor market outcomes. Married women lose $500.85 (i.e.
$1,465 increase in earnings multiplied by a 0.344 reduction in the transfer) in transfers,
because of an increase in earnings potential, but gain $693.14 because the earnings
potential of their spouses increases as well for a net increase in transfers of $192.
If black women remain single and decide to work, they do not receive a transfer
but experience a relatively large increase in utility as the utility from consumption
is higher for single women than married women. Similarly, black males keep all
their earnings increase if they decide to be single and gain 3.209 utils if single and
working (relative to single and not working). Therefore, remaining single is now a
more attractive alternative to marriage for both black men and women.
It is also worth noting that a large rise in employment rates for black women
and men results from the policy change. The employment rates for black males in
particular rise to above those that we observe in the data for white males, as black
males receive more utility from the single, working state in the model than white
males do.
35The parameter estimates for the earnings equations are presented in Appendix D.
376.3 Marriage subsidies
A ﬁnal policy experiment considered here is one that has been widely debated by
policy makers and widely discussed in the literature: the role of marriage taxes and
subsidies (Brien, Lillard and Stern, 2001; Chade and Ventura, 2001a; 2001b; Alm and
Whittington, 1995; Sjoquist and Walker, 1995). What happens to marital behavior
if married couples receive a subsidy in this framework? The experiment is conducted
by increasing the intercept in the non-labor income equation for married couples by
$500.36 For the particular sample in question, this subsidy represents a relatively
small increase in the total income available to married couples in which at least one
spouse works.
The results of the marriage subsidy policy experiment are illustrated in Figure 9.
The introduction of a marriage subsidy results in an initial rise in marriage rates in
both marriage markets, as marriage becomes more attractive and ﬁnancially viable
earlier. However, as the pool of remaining singles declines, black marriage rates fall
as the sex ratio declines and as the opportunities of black women in the labor market
increase relative to those for black males.37 Since males directly beneﬁt from the
increase in non-labor income in this case, there is an income eﬀect on the employment
decisions of white married men. The employment eﬀect of the marriage subsidy is
substantial for white males, where employment rates fall up to 20 percentage points
for men who have been in the marriage market 4 to 5 years. The employment rate
for black married men does not fall to the same extent as for whites, as the marriage
subsidy is suﬃciently large to enable more men to pay the transfer but not large
enough to allow married blacks to enjoy more leisure time.
36The parameter estimates for non-labor income are presented in Appendix D.
37Earnings increase with age at a faster rate for women than for men. See Appendix D for further
details.
387 Conclusion
This paper provides new insight into the causes and consequences of the dramatic
diﬀerences in family structure and employment across sex and race that characterize
recent U.S. history. The model is consistent with many of the stylized facts on the joint
patterns of marriage and employment across race and sex, including the low marriage
rates of blacks relative to whites, the high employment rates for black married women
relative to white married women and the corresponding low employment rates for
black men as compared to white men. The estimation results suggest that quality and
quantity in the marriage market both matter. In particular, the presence of search
friction in the marriage market, the responsiveness of intra-household transfers to
the sex ratio, the quality of the marital pool, and the options of agents outside of
marriage all play important roles in explaining the observed diﬀerences in behavior
across blacks and whites.
The policy experiments presented here make two important points. First, any
policy that impacts household formation decisions in the current period directly in-
ﬂuences future conditions in the marriage market by changing the size and quality
of the remaining pool of singles available to match. Second, the fact that men and
women both respond to policies that alter the attractiveness of marriage and em-
ployment may produce predictions contrary to those produced by one-sided models
of marriage. The policy experiments conducted here highlight the fact that policies
aimed to reduce racial diﬀerences in socio-economic outcomes do not necessarily im-
ply better opportunities for black women, as the quality of spouses on both sides of
the marriage market will change.
39Table 1: Sample Statistics by Race and Sex (Selected Years)
Variable Black Black White White
Men Women Men Women
1979
Children 0.0413 0.1479 0.0398 0.0531
High School Diploma 0.4247 0.2152 0.5856 0.2871
Married 0.0465 0.0372 0.0825 0.0902
Working 0.4210 0.1180 0.6251 0.2541
Non-Labor Income 252.37 221.93 325.48 135.40
Earnings 6,781.28 4,620.12 7,845.96 4,629.34
1985
Children 0.2696 0.6028 0.3140 0.3455
High School Diploma 0.8073 0.8132 0.8448 0.8610
Married 0.2773 0.2632 0.4815 0.5366
Working 0.7508 0.4896 0.8908 0.6990
Non-Labor Income 541.05 1,440.42 737.82 693.08
Earnings 10,916.63 7,679.74 14,491.13 8,867.56
1996
Children 0.6361 0.8050 0.7043 0.7529
High School Diploma 0.8652 0.8475 0.8636 0.8869
Married 0.4979 0.3981 0.7127 0.7630
Working 0.7980 0.7101 0.9372 0.7030
Non-Labor Income 795.85 1,716.66 1,201.23 1,470.07
Earnings 17,937.47 13,474.80 24,616.36 15,386.95
Note: earnings are calculated on the samples of working men and women only.
40Table 2: Employment Rates by Race and Marital





















Note: standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Contact and Estimated Acceptance Rates
Contact Acceptance
Rate Rate (Single)
Black Females 0.814 0.574
White Females 0.887 0.655
Black Males 0.999 0.749
White Males 0.858 0.873




Intercept -5.777 2.533 2.689
(0.484) (0.175) (0.342)
Black 0.561 -1.187 -2.630
(0.135) (0.056) (0.183)
Children -2.801 0.015 -1.215
(0.104) (0.042) (0.037)
Consumption 0.001 -0.00017 -0.00061
(0.00007) (0.00008)
Marital-Speciﬁc Capital 0.135 0.135
(0.008) (0.008)
Men
Intercept -6.744 8.669 -4.239
(0.877) (1.939) (0.812)
Black 2.153 0.577 -0.162
(0.235) (1.037) (0.389)
Children -0.695 -3.982 -4.380
(0.157) (0.220) (0.175)
Consumption 0.001 0.0032 0.001
(0.00218)
Marital-Speciﬁc Capital 2.266 2.266
(0.088) (0.088)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
43Table 6: First Birth Probability Estimates
Single Females Single Males Married Couples
Years in marriage market -0.313 -0.366 -2.463
(0.065) (0.010) (0.056)
Education of Female -0.730 0.961
(0.083) (0.051)
Education of Male 0.401 1.485
(0.078) (0.283)
Black 1.032 1.533 -0.787
(0.114) (0.341) (0.073)
Northeast -0.907 1.716 0.074
(0.117) (0.432) (0.090)
South -0.277 0.888 0.077
(0.114) (0.257) (0.051)
West -0.477 2.367 -1.430
(0.074) (0.323) (0.040)
Marital Speciﬁc Capital -0.0821
(0.0558)
Intercept -2.363 -7.454 -1.427
(0.079) (0.175) (0.074)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.





















































































45Figure 2: Marriage and Employment Rates by Region, Race and Sex
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46Figure 3: Marriage and Employment Rates by Region, Race and Sex
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47Figure 4: Comparison of Actual and Simulated Employment Rates




















































































48Figure 5: Comparison of Actual and Simulated Marriage Rates
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Baseline White Earnings Profiles
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53A Reduced Form Representation of the Model
The reduced form representation of the model can be derived from the structural
model by substituting (2)-(4) into (1). The discrete nature of the choice variables
implies the value functions are only identiﬁed relative to a base. Therefore, the
preference parameters for the single and not working state are normalized to zero
and yG
snt is subtracted from each state. The utility parameters in the remaining three
states are thus to be interpreted as relative to the single, not-working state. The









































































































































































m + (1 − φ
M)α
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where the α’s are parameters from the earnings equations and the ζ’s are parameters
from the non-labor income equations as deﬁned in Appendix B.
Composite error terms εG
kt, k ∈ {sn,sh,mn,mh} for the above reduced form






















































































for men. Note that the problem faced by male and female agents within the model dif-
fers in two respects. First, preference parameters and the parameters in the earnings
and non-labor income equations are allowed to vary across gender. Second, the budget
constraints for married men and women diﬀer due to the presence of intra-household
transfers and the assumption that women receive transfers and men consume the
couple’s remaining marital non-labor income.
55B Econometric Speciﬁcation
B.1 Construction of the Likelihood Function
Following van der Klaauw (1996) and others, the extreme value assumption is shown



























B.2 Estimation of Earnings and Non-Labor Income
Earnings and non-labor income are estimated on non-random samples, where the
selection of the sample is determined by the employment and marital status decisions
of the respondents. To control for sample selection bias selection correction terms
are constructed as in van der Klaauw (1996) and Dubin and McFadden (1984) and
included in estimation. Unbiased standard errors for the earnings and non-labor
income equations can be calculated in the ﬁnal stage of estimation as outlined in
Section 4.3 of the text.
B.2.1 Earnings
As speciﬁed by the model and outlined above, earnings equations must be estimated
for individuals and their spouses or potential spouses. Therefore, two sets of earnings
equations are estimated. The ﬁrst set utilizes individual characteristics for men and







i i + α
G
t t + e
G
wt,
is estimated separately for men and for women, and is used by individuals in t when
determining their personal earnings and by individuals married in t − 1 when deter-
mining the earnings of their spouses in t. The earnings equation must be selection
56corrected for the fact that the sample used to estimate earnings is limited to la-













k = 0 if the conditional expectation
of eG
























jt is the probability that alternative j is chosen by the individual of gender
G in period t (Pr(dG
jt = 1)). Then, the conditional expectation of the error in the

















































and the conditional expectation of the error in the earnings equation for married,




































sht = 1 or d
G




i i + α
G




















































































































































































where 1(·) is an indicator function, P G
kt = Pr(dG
kt = 1|KG
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mnt, and b RG
mht are estimated by replacing the P G0
kt s and P ∗G0
kt s by their
predicted values following estimation of the reduced form choice probabilities. The
error term in (23), ²G
wt, is mean zero.
B.2.2 Non-Labor Income
As speciﬁed by the model, three sets of non-labor income equations are estimated,
depending on the marital and employment status of the individuals in the sample.
The non-labor income equation for single, non-working individuals (dG


















































































































































































mnt, and b BG
mht are estimated by replacing the P G0
kt s and P ∗G0
kt s by their
predicted values following estimation of the reduced form choice probabilities. The
error term in (25) is mean zero.













and are selection corrected to account for the bias that may be induced by estimating
non-labor income on samples of single, working women and men only (dG
sht = 1).





































































































































































































mnt, and b CG
mht are estimated by replacing the P G0
kt s and P ∗G0
kt s by their
predicted values following estimation of the reduced form choice probabilities. The
error term in (27) is mean zero.







jmj + ζtmt + emt.
Since data are only available on non-labor income for married couples, non-labor
income is estimated on the sample of married men and women only (dG
mnt = 1 or
dG
mht = 1) and is selection corrected accordingly. The conditional expectation of the




























t−1 = 0) (28)
60and the conditional expectation of the error in the non-labor income equations for




























t−1 = 0). (29)






mnt = 1 or d
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The non-labor income equation to be estimated is thus
y
G





















mnt, and b DG
mht are estimated by replacing the P G0
kt s and P ∗G0
kt s by their
predicted values following estimation of the reduced form choice probabilities. The
error term in (30) is mean zero.
61B.2.3 Construction of the MDE Covariance Matrix
The derivation of the weighting matrix used to estimate the structural parameters
follows directly from Hansen (1982) and van der Klaauw (1996). The estimation of the
weighting matrix is based on the ﬁrst order conditions satisﬁed by the estimators of
the reduced form parameters. Denote fj the jth ﬁrst order condition in the system and
ψj the jth vector of reduced form parameter estimates. Speciﬁcally, the estimators of








fj(ψ1,ψj) = 0, j = 2,...15 (32)
(31) represents the ﬁrst order conditions satisﬁed by the reduced form choice and
fertility probabilities. The ﬁrst order conditions described by (32) correspond to
the two earnings and ﬁve non-labor earnings equations from the second stage of
estimation. Notice that the ﬁrst order conditions for earnings and non-labor income
are dependent on the reduced form choice probability parameters, which enter the
selection correction terms. Hansen (1982) derives the asymptotic distribution of the




















62C Reduced Form Parameter Estimates






















Note: standard errors in parentheses.
63C.2 Choice Probability Parameter Estimates in the Married,
Not-Working State
Female Male




















Education of spouse -0.1618 3.3380
(0.0277) (0.2920)
Log likelihood -77,179.2279
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
64C.3 Choice Probability Parameter Estimates in the Married,
Working State
Female Male




















Education of spouse 0.1556 3.6390
(0.0200) (0.2837)
Log likelihood -77,179.2279
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
65C.4 Fertility and Marriage-Speciﬁc Capital
Single Women Single Men Married Couples
Fertility
Time/10 -0.3130 -0.3664 -2.463
(0.0829) (0.0775) (0.0508)
Female Education -0.7298 0.9614
(0.1140) (0.0730)
Male Education 0.4008 1.4850
(0.3408) (0.0558)




Northeast -0.9066 1.1716 0.0748
(0.1140) (0.2570) (0.0512)
South -0.2769 0.8884 0.0768
(0.0738) (0.3230) (0.0395)
West -0.4766 2.367 -1.4300
(0.1171) (0.2830) (0.0647)








Note: standard errors in parentheses.
66C.5 Earnings and Non-Labor Income Parameters for Females
Variable Earnings Non-Labor Non-Labor
Income (sn) Income (sh)
Northeast 1.933 -0.2932 -0.069
(0.142) (0.078) (0.046)
South 1.340 -0.615 -0.007
(0.113) (0.062) (0.044)
West 0.865 -0.152 0.017
(0.143) (0.079) (0.051)
Black -1.438 -0.018 -0.040
(0.106) (0.059) (0.049)
Education 2.847 -0.222 0.084
(0.160) (0.057) (0.058)
Time/10 0.877 0.983 -0.022
(0.059) (0.267) (0.186)




Intercept -0.118 1.820 0.803
(0.242) (0.107) (0.095)
λF
sh 0.173 0.008 0.007
(0.108) (0.078) (0.043)
λF
mn 0.200 0.909 -0.608
(0.184) (0.633) (0.400)
λF
mh 0.060 -0.799 0.599
(0.036) (0.698) (0.402)
Observations 19,193 4,580 5,047
Note: standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is
measured in thousands of dollars.
67C.6 Earnings and Non-Labor Income Parameters for Males
Variable Earnings Non-Labor Non-Labor Non-Labor
Income (sn) Income (sh) Income (mn or mh)
Northeast 2.356 -0.056 0.028 0.053
(0.172) (0.090) (0.054) (0.026)
South 0.474 -0.172 -0.029 -0.149
(0.157) (0.081) (0.057) (0.022)
West 1.361 0.028 0.047 -0.083
(0.192) (0.095) (0.062) (0.027)
Black -3.682 -0.095 -0.002 -0.106
(0.211) (0.082) (0.078) (0.033)
Education 4.114 0.096 -0.111 -0.141
(0.175) (0.081) (0.074) (0.026)
Time/10 0.585 0.580 -0.140 0.329
(0.068) (0.302) (0.203) (0.110)
Time2/100 0.005 -0.160 0.013 -0.125
(0.004) (0.180) (0.119) (0.056)
Child 0.215 0.450 0.048
(0.110) (0.070) (0.020)
Education of spouse 0.012
(0.028)
Intercept 2.314 1.427 1.383 0.392
(0.289) (0.122) (0.099) (0.057)
λM
sh -0.049 0.191 -0.014 -0.191
(0.0248) (0.138) (0.012) (0.609)
λM
mn 0.256 -0.998 -0.589 0.044
(0.169) (1.242) (0.722) (0.048)
λM
mh -0.009 0.371 0.445 -0.041
(0.006) (1.102) (0.644) (0.062)
Observations 19,782 2,092 4,914 6,040
Note: standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is measured in
thousands of dollars.
68D Structural Parameter Estimates





Years in marriage market 5.593 -3.365 -0.329
(0.156) (0.263) (0.233)
Square of years in marriage market -2.218 2.371 2.016
(0.082) (0.142) (0.121)




Northeast -1.880 0.020 1.071
(0.155) (0.093) (0.161)
South -0.179 0.165 0.210
(0.135) (0.054) (0.070)
West -1.442 -0.274 0.040
(0.172) (0.080) (0.115)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.




Years in marriage market 2.543 4.601 5.726
(0.168) (0.714) (0.584)
(0.1371) (0.1194)
Square of years in marriage market -1.272 -4.752 -4.910
(0.084) (0.319) (0.263)
(0.0830) (0.1733)





Northeast -2.497 -1.150 -2.985
(0.186) (0.757) (0.269)
South -0.545 -0.436 0.750
(0.174) (0.244) (0.164)
West -1.699 -0.881 -1.811
(0.210) (0.506) (0.225)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
70D.3 Earnings and Non-Labor Income Parameter Estimates
for Females
Variable Earnings Non-Labor Non-Labor
Income (sn) Income (sh)
Northeast 1.993 -0.263 -0.045
(0.140) (0.083) (0.051)
South 0.333 -0.541 0.035
(0.119) (0.071) (0.050)
West 1.034 0.427 0.229
(0.154) (0.087) (0.058)
Black -11.456 0.011 0.106
(0.111) (0.071) (0.064)
Education 2.842 -0.434 -0.247
(0.169) (0.067) (0.078)
Time/10 0.877 -0.047 -0.090
(0.336) (0.046) (0.046)




Intercept 0.845 1.281 1.337
(0.336) (0.133) (0.334)
λF
sh -0.396 -0.132 -0.093
(0.083) (0.164) (0.041)
λF
mn 0.376 3.106 -0.527
(-.114) (0.412) (0.351)
λF
mh -0.075 -3.079 0.287
(0.027) (0.459) (0.355)
Note: standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is
measured in thousands of dollars.
71D.4 Earnings and Non-Labor Income Parameter Estimates
for Males
Variable Earnings Non-Labor Non-Labor Non-Labor
Income (sn) Income (sh) Income (mn or mh)
Northeast 2.390 -0.038 0.229 0.022
(0.168) (0.117) (0.066) (0.026)
South 0.444 0.220 0.126 -0.122
(0.155) (0.112) (0.068) (0.021)
West 1.490 0.334 0.153 -0.095
(0.189) (0.129) (0.077) (0.027)
Black -3.210 0.061 0.116 -0.188
(0.209) (0.118) (0.010) (0.032)
Education 4.326 0.538 -0.087 -0.053
(0.173) (0.114) (0.091) (0.025)
Time/10 0.585 -0.250 0.017 0.056
(0.068) (0.152) (0.074) (0.011)
Time2/100 0.005 0.018 0.0004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001)
Child 1.118 0.853 0.042
(0.296) (0.142) (0.019)
Education of spouse 0.053
(0.028)
Intercept 5.834 -0.679 0.639 0.104
(0.380) (0.492) (0.788) (0.056)
λM
sh -0.007 -1.397 -0.0006 -1.264
(0.017) (0.554) (0.010) (0.268)
λM
mn -2.808 5.687 -0.813 0.762
(0.220) (2.334) (0.610) (0.022)
λM
mh 0.037 -4.291 0.779 0.034
(0.005) (1.899) (0.521) (0.031)
Note: standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is measured in
thousands of dollars.
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